Question to the EC: Transboundary environmental impact assessment process for reactor lifetime extensions in the EU

including Francisco Guerreiro.See here the joint question by Greens/EFA MEPs Francisco Guerreiro, Thomas Waitz, Monika Vana, Michèle Rivasi, Michael Bloss, Piernicola Pedicini, Reinhard Bütikofer, Sarah Wiener, Anna Deparnay-Grunenberg, Damien Carême, Katrin Langensiepen, Eleonora Evi, Daniel Freund, Niklas Nienaß, Claude Gruffat, Ignazio Corrao, Margrete Auken, Kira Marie Peter-Hansen, Jutta Paulus.
Subject: Transboundary environmental impact assessment procedure for the extension of reactor lifetimes in the EUA response from the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany(1) reveals that the following reactors are operating in the EU beyond their originally planned lifespan:1 unit at the Borssele nuclear power plant (Netherlands)1 unit at the Tihange nuclear power plant (Belgium)4 units at the Dukovany nuclear power plant (Czech Republic)1 unit at the Santa María de Garoña nuclear power plant, 2 units at the Almaraz nuclear power plant (Spain)2 units at the Kosloduj nuclear power plant (Bulgaria)

4 units of the Blayais nuclear power plant; 4 units of the Bugey nuclear power plant; 4 units of the Chinon nuclear power plant, 4 units of the Cruas nuclear power plant; 4 units of the Dampierre nuclear power plant; 6 units of the Gravlines nuclear power plant, 2 units of the Saint-Laurent nuclear power plant; 4 units of the Tricastin nuclear power plant (France)According to the judgment of the CJEU (Case C-411/17), the extension of the service life of the Belgian reactors Doel-1 and Doel-2 beyond the duration initially planned, without carrying out a transboundary environmental impact assessment, was illegal.1. Has the Commission taken steps to investigate the infringement procedures relating to the extension of the operating life of the reactors included in the above list? If so, what measures were taken? If not, why was no action taken?2. What measures are planned, in particular with regard to the implementation of the CJEU ruling under the Espoo Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context?3. The security of electricity supply argument allowed the Doel-1 and Doel-2 reactors to continue operating, despite the fact that no environmental impact assessment had been carried out. However, a study by the Munich Environment Institute(2) refutes the argument of security of electricity supply in Belgium. How does the Commission verify the veracity of the information on the security of electricity supply in Belgium?

(1) http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/19/234/1923490.pdf, point 20.

(2) http://www.umweltinstitut.org/aktuelle-meldungen/meldungen/2020/atom/kurzstudie-versorgungssicherheit-in-belgien.html .

Written reply

In its preliminary ruling in Doel case C-411/17(1), the Court of Justice of the EU concluded that the 10-year extension of the lifetime of the Doel 1 and Doel 2 nuclear power plants is a project falling within the scope of the Environmental Impact Assessment Directive (EIA Directive)(2). As such, it should have been subject to a mandatory environmental impact assessment and the transboundary effects assessment process provided for in that directive.

The Parties to the Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context (Espoo Convention) agreed in December 2020 on guidelines for extending the lifetime of nuclear power plants(3). The Commission will publish guidance on the practical consequences of the C-411/17 case for Member States' legal obligations regarding the modification and extension of projects, including nuclear power plants.

Without prejudice to the Commission's powers as guardian of the Treaties, it is primarily up to the Member States to ensure the correct application of EU law, in particular the EIA Directive. With regard to the plants referred to in the question, notwithstanding the above-mentioned legal obligations of the Member States, the Commission will assess the risk preparedness plans that each Member State must submit by January 2022. These plans(4) should include measures to prevent and mitigate electricity crises, based on the analysis of a set of electricity crisis scenarios identified at regional and national level.

(1) Judgment of the Court of Justice of the EU (Grand Chamber) of July 29, 2019 (ECLI:EU:C:2019:622).

(2) Directive 2011/92/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment, OJ L 26, 28.1.2012, p. 1.

(3) Unedited version:https://unece.org/sites/default/files/2020-

12/ECE.MP_.EIA_.2020.9_Guidance_on_LTE__ENG_As_finalized_9.12.2020.pdf(4) Prepared under Regulation (EU) 2019/941 on risk preparedness in the electricity sector.

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